In San Antonio, there comes a time each year when the climate cools enough for residents to wonder if snow might actually fall. However, since January 1986, this has yet to become a reality. The weather forecast for Monday, February 15, 2021, predicted snow—a prospect that many found unbelievable. With a forecasted high of just 30 degrees and a low plummeting to 14 degrees, accompanied by expectations of freezing rain, sleet, and possibly snow, these numbers seemed surreal to many.
Amidst these chilling temperatures, the Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT) was monitoring the situation closely, sensing an impending crisis.
In Episode 11 of The Engines of Texanity, we delve into the catastrophic events of Winter Storm Uri in February 2021, examining how the concept of Texanity failed and left the state isolated and vulnerable during one of its harshest winters.
While every other state in the U.S. relies on federally regulated interstate grids for their electricity, Texas boasts a unique situation. Its vast size, rich energy resources, and independent spirit led to the establishment of its own self-regulated electrical grid. ERCOT operates as the independent system operator for this grid. Inspired by the deregulation in the airline industry, Texas took the bold step to deregulate its electric markets in 1999. ERCOT conducts electricity auctions every 15 minutes, allowing energy producers to compete for the right to supply the grid, with the lowest bidder winning the contract.
During the winter of 2021, ERCOT had approximately 82,500 megawatts of reliable electricity connected to the system on any given day, factoring in renewable resources like wind and solar along with any maintenance outages. The grid theoretically had a maximum capacity of around 119,000 megawatts. On average, the daily electricity demand across Texas hovered around 40,000 megawatts, with the highest winter demand ever recorded reaching about 69,000 megawatts. This discrepancy between capacity and demand became crucial as the storm approached.
As dawn broke on Sunday, February 14, the freezing temperatures began to take their toll. ERCOT quickly recognized that issues were beginning to surface. Natural gas prices surged as power plants struggled to secure the fuel necessary for electricity generation. Wind farms started to go offline due to declining winds, and equipment began to freeze. Meanwhile, solar farms became inactive as the sun disappeared. ERCOT issued a voluntary conservation alert, yet Texans responded by turning up their thermostats. By 7 p.m., peak electricity demand reached an astonishing 69,222 megawatts—20% higher than the worst-case scenario predictions. When ERCOT called upon the 13,000 megawatts of electricity that should have been available, it simply did not materialize.
At 12:15 a.m. on Monday morning, ERCOT declared a Level 1 Energy Emergency Alert, signaling that electricity reserves were dangerously low and that conservation was critical. Just over an hour later, a Level 3 alert was issued, indicating that to avert a total blackout, ERCOT initiated rolling blackouts, cutting power to entire regions of the state. Within a few hours, nearly 20,000 megawatts of electricity were curtailed, affecting about a third of the population, and further cuts were implemented throughout the night.
By Tuesday, February 16, with the freezing temperatures persisting and rolling blackouts continuing, Texas was generating only 46.8% of the electricity it should have been able to produce. The state had nowhere to turn for assistance. Excluding a few cities on the periphery, such as El Paso, Amarillo, Texarkana, and Beaumont, the majority of Texas found itself completely isolated from the broader U.S. electricity grid.
On Wednesday, February 17, the most significant issue emerged—the rolling power outages were affecting the gas processing plants that supplied the power plants with fuel. Once ERCOT prioritized electricity supply to these critical facilities, the situation began to improve. Electricity production finally started to ramp up, but it took several days for temperatures to rise and for power restoration efforts to reach most residents.
Much of the blame for the failures during Winter Storm Uri falls squarely on ERCOT. The organization had conducted several worst-case scenario models, accounting for factors like low wind production, gas plants shutting down, and spikes in demand if all Texans turned on their heating. However, it had never anticipated all these issues occurring simultaneously. When Texans desperately required 76,000 megawatts of electricity to keep their homes warm, ERCOT was delivering less than 50,000.
Winter Storm Uri ultimately became the second-worst natural disaster in Texas history, with official reports indicating 246 fatalities—though unofficially, the number may exceed 700. Did Texans’ sense of exceptionalism lead them to create a system that ultimately failed them? This question has sparked considerable debate among political and media circles, often distracting from a more nuanced discussion about what could have truly prevented this disaster.
It is disheartening when the lessons of history seem to fall on deaf ears, yet there are still valuable lessons to be learned today. As a frontier culture, Texas has had the privilege and the responsibility to embrace what works while discarding what does not. This adaptability is evident in various examples throughout our podcast series: from the early Lipan horsemen in Texas to the Spanish irrigation systems that shaped government, from Gail Borden’s failures leading to condensed milk to the railroads facilitating prosperity across Texas, from Spindletop igniting the state’s oil boom to Southwest Airlines’ determination to fly across the Love Triangle.
At its core, Texas serves as a living testament to the idea that materialism can be a formidable virtue in a frontier culture—an attribute that has sustained Texans through centuries of violence, disease, and transformation.
Click below to listen to Episode 11 of The Engines of Texanity.
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