In the aftermath of the voting, the disappointment among supporters of the opposition was palpable. Contrary to expectations of trailing behind Kilicdaroglu, Erdogan emerged with a comfortable lead, surpassing him by nearly five percentage points, and was close to securing a definitive victory with nearly half of the total votes. Both candidates are now set to face each other in a runoff election scheduled for May 28, although many analysts believe that Erdogan’s return to power has become inevitable. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP) and its coalition partners retained control of the Turkish parliament, solidifying their political dominance.
Similar to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, Erdogan has honed a sophisticated understanding of how to solidify electoral advantages among the electorate — and leverage his considerable power and influence to achieve this. This strategy was evident in previous elections held in 2015 and 2018, where Erdogan vilified the opposition, sowed fear about the perceived threats they posed, and exploited the deep-seated resentments harbored by his devout, nationalist base against Turkey’s often secular elites.
Once the dust settled, international observers deemed the election to be largely free and fair, albeit with notable caveats regarding the country’s quasi-authoritarian atmosphere: “The ongoing restrictions on fundamental freedoms of assembly, association, and expression hindered the participation of some opposition figures, political parties, civil society organizations, and independent media in the election process,” stated a report led by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. “Nonetheless, the electoral campaign was competitive and generally free for the majority of candidates, characterized by intense polarization and marred by aggressive rhetoric, misuse of administrative resources, and intimidation faced by one opposition party.”
The election results underscored Erdogan’s adeptness at maneuvering through the intricacies of the Turkish political landscape. Prior to the elections, key political rivals were either imprisoned or faced the looming threat of prosecution based on dubious charges. Over the years, Erdogan has strategically embedded loyalists within state institutions. Allies in the business sector have transformed once-independent media outlets into pro-government platforms — creating an information environment heavily skewed in his favor.
The left-leaning, pro-Kurdish Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) has faced relentless attacks and legal battles; both of its primary leaders are currently imprisoned, and numerous legislators and local officials have been barred or subjected to politically motivated criminal proceedings. HDP candidates joined the electoral lists of the Green Left Party, which also endured a government-backed pressure campaign that resulted in the arrests of some candidates and supporters.
“Undoubtedly, the election was technically free, albeit practically unfair,” remarked Amberin Zaman, an experienced journalist covering Turkey for Al-Monitor. “Erdogan has exploited the one-man-rule framework established following a controversial referendum in 2018 to tilt the system in his favor, undermining media independence and filling the judiciary and other critical institutions with loyalists. His extensive propaganda machinery has been disseminating falsehoods about the opposition. In April, Erdogan received 32 hours of airtime on state television compared to just 32 minutes for Kilicdaroglu.”
“In the weeks leading up to the vote, Erdogan employed various tactics, including increasing salaries for public workers and providing free gas to households,” my contacts reported from Istanbul. “While the president’s speeches were given blanket coverage on Turkish news channels, Kilicdaroglu primarily relied on his Twitter account and recorded speeches at his kitchen table to convey his messages to the public, often focusing on economic issues.”
Amidst a skewed political environment, Erdogan still enjoys a devoted support base. “The surprising electoral performance underscored the enduring appeal of the president, and the resonance of his political message among a base of conservative, pious voters with strong nationalist sentiments,” noted the Financial Times.
Meanwhile, the coalition of six parties that rallied behind Kilicdaroglu may struggle to maintain their unity for an extended period. This alliance comprises a mix of secular, religious, and nationalist factions whose ability to collaborate was a significant achievement in itself, reflecting the widespread desire to end the Erdogan era. However, sensing imminent failure, their internal ideological divisions and political rivalries may soon resurface.
All these factors position Erdogan favorably as he prepares for the runoff election. “Firstly, his coalition’s control over parliament enables him to argue that a Kilicdaroglu victory would lead to political deadlock,” stated Howard Eissenstat, a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute. “Secondly, and perhaps more critically, the election results highlight a rise in nationalist sentiment. While both Kilicdaroglu and Erdogan can make valid claims on this segment of the electorate, Kilicdaroglu’s success relies heavily on the Kurdish vote. Without their support, he cannot win; however, many nationalist voters are unlikely to back him.”
Erdogan has spent years navigating the treacherous waters of Turkish politics. His government played a significant role two decades ago in pushing through major reforms that eliminated harsh restrictions on the use of the Kurdish language and promoted Kurdish identity. However, in more recent years, he has adopted a more nationalist stance, vilifying pro-Kurdish politicians as “terrorist” sympathizers and escalating a brutal counterinsurgency against a separatist group in southeastern Turkey.
On the campaign trail, Erdogan also tapped into the anxieties among religious Turks regarding a potential return to a bygone era of aggressive secularism, long championed by the predecessors of Kilicdaroglu’s Republican People’s Party (CHP). This fearmongering and cultural warfare appeared to resonate particularly well in Turkey’s rural areas, where Erdogan draws most of his support. Notably, the apprehension among some conservative voters about Kilicdaroglu’s Alevi identity — representing a more mystical, universalist branch of Islam that has faced historical persecution in this predominantly Sunni Muslim nation — also seems to have played a role.
Outside the major coastal cities, the capital Ankara, and regions with significant Kurdish populations, the opposition’s left-right alliance “failed in the rest of the country,” tweeted Soner Cagaptay, a senior fellow at the Washington Institute, adding that it was in these areas “where Erdogan demonized HDP support for Kilicdaroglu and exploited his Alevi identity to polarize the electorate along a right versus left divide, benefiting his right-wing constituency.”
Furthermore, the public outrage surrounding the subpar construction practices during Erdogan’s administration, which resulted in catastrophic failures after February’s earthquake, did not translate into significant electoral consequences. “Economic mismanagement and pervasive corruption did not resonate as strongly as many, including myself, had anticipated,” wrote MIT professor Daron Acemoglu. “These issues were relevant in urban centers, but not in regions where the AKP established and leveraged its patronage networks.”
The overarching lesson appears clear: In this critical moment for Turkish democracy, and potentially for democracies worldwide, identity politics has taken precedence over all other considerations.
